ABSTRACT
On the 24th November 2021 the sequence of a new SARS CoV-2 viral isolate Omicron-B.1.1.529 was announced, containing far more mutations in Spike (S) than previously reported variants. Neutralization titres of Omicron by sera from vaccinees and convalescent subjects infected with early pandemic as well as Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta are substantially reduced or fail to neutralize. Titres against Omicron are boosted by third vaccine doses and are high in cases both vaccinated and infected by Delta. Mutations in Omicron knock out or substantially reduce neutralization by most of a large panel of potent monoclonal antibodies and antibodies under commercial development. Omicron S has structural changes from earlier viruses, combining mutations conferring tight binding to ACE2 to unleash evolution driven by immune escape, leading to a large number of mutations in the ACE2 binding site which rebalance receptor affinity to that of early pandemic viruses. A comprehensive analysis of sera from vaccinees, convalescent patients infected previously by multiple variants and potent monoclonal antibodies from early in the COVID-19 pandemic reveals a substantial overall reduction the ability to neutralize the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant, which a third vaccine dose seems to ameliorate. Structural analyses of the Omicron RBD suggest a selective pressure enabling the virus bind ACE2 with increased affinity that is offset by other changes in the receptor binding motif that facilitates immune escape.
ABSTRACT
BackgroundCOVID-19 has resulted in many infections in healthcare workers (HCWs) globally. We performed state-wide SARS-CoV-2 genomic epidemiological investigations to identify HCW transmission dynamics and provide recommendations to optimise healthcare system preparedness for future outbreaks. MethodsGenome sequencing was attempted on all COVID-19 cases in Victoria, Australia. We combined genomic and epidemiologic data to investigate the source of HCW infections across multiple healthcare facilities (HCFs) in the state. Phylogenetic analysis and fine-scale hierarchical clustering were performed for the entire Victorian dataset including community and healthcare cases. Facilities provided standardised epidemiological data and putative transmission links. FindingsBetween March and October 2020, approximately 1,240 HCW COVID-19 infection cases were identified; 765 are included here. Genomic sequencing was successful for 612 (80%) cases. Thirty-six investigations were undertaken across 12 HCFs. Genomic analysis revealed that multiple introductions of COVID-19 into facilities (31/36) were more common than single introductions (5/36). Major contributors to HCW acquisitions included mobility of staff and patients between wards and facilities, and characteristics and behaviours of individual patients including super-spreading events. Key limitations at the HCF level were identified. InterpretationGenomic epidemiological analyses enhanced understanding of HCW infections, revealing unsuspected clusters and transmission networks. Combined analysis of all HCWs and patients in a HCF should be conducted, supported by high rates of sequencing coverage for all cases in the population. Established systems for integrated genomic epidemiological investigations in healthcare settings will improve HCW safety in future pandemics. FundingThe Victorian Government, the National Health and Medical Research Council Australia, and the Medical Research Future Fund.
Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Agricultural Workers' Diseases , InfectionsABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: A cornerstone of Australia’s ability to control COVID-19 has been effective border control, using an extensive supervised quarantine program. However, a rapid recrudescence in COVID-19 cases was observed in the state of Victoria in June 2020. Here, we describe the genomic findings that located the source of this second wave as a breach in supervised hotel quarantine and demonstrate the successful elimination of COVID-19 for a second time in Australia.METHODS: Genome sequencing was performed on all available SARS-CoV-2-positive samples in Victoria and integrated genomic and epidemiological investigation undertaken.RESULTS: At 31st January 2021, 20,451 COVID-19 cases were reported in Victoria; samples were sequenced from 75% of cases (15,431/20,451). Genomics revealed 98% (10,426/10,646) of locally-acquired cases during the second wave were derived from a single incursion from hotel quarantine, with the outbreak strain rapidly detected in other Australian states and territories. Phylodynamic analyses indicated an epidemic growth rate comparable to emerging variants, such as B.1.1.7 in the United Kingdom. Strict public health interventions resulted in the elimination of the outbreak strain by 29th October 2020. Subsequent cases represented independent international or interstate introductions, with limited local spread.CONCLUSIONS: Rapid escalation of clonal outbreaks can occur from even a single breach of control practices, as revealed through our genomic ‘enhanced outbreak-detection' system. The subsequent elimination and rapid control of new SARS-CoV-2 incursions reinforce that decisive public health responses to emergent cases are effective even with high epidemic growth rates, and “elimination” should be favored in settings where this is achievable.FUNDING STATEMENT: The Microbiological Diagnostic Unit Public Health Laboratory (MDU PHL) and the Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory (VIDRL) at The Doherty Institute are funded by the Victorian Government. This work was supported by the National Health and Medical Research Council, Australia (NHMRC); Partnership Grant (APP1149991), Investigator Grant to BPH (APP1196103), Investigator Grant to DAW (APP1174555), Research Fellowship to TPS (APP1105525), MRFF COVID-19 Genomics Grant (MRF9200006).DECLARATION OF INTERESTS: None to declare. ETHICS APPROVAL STATEMENT: Data were collected in accordance with the Victorian Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008. Ethical approval was received from the University of Melbourne Human Research Ethics Committee (study number 1954615.3).